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Abstract
Software-defined networking (SDN) is revolutionizing the net-
working industry, but current SDN programming platforms do not
provide automated mechanisms for updating global configurations
on the fly. Implementing updates by hand is challenging for SDN
programmers because networks are distributed systems with hun-
dreds or thousands of interacting nodes. Even if initial and final
configurations are correct, naı¨vely updating individual nodes can
lead to incorrect transient behaviors, including loops, black holes,
and access control violations. This paper presents an approach for
automatically synthesizing updates that are guaranteed to preserve
specified properties. We formalize network updates as a distributed
programming problem and develop a synthesis algorithm based on
counterexample-guided search and incremental model checking.
We describe a prototype implementation, and present results from
experiments on real-world topologies and properties demonstrating
that our tool scales to updates involving over one-thousand nodes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software En-
gineering]: Software/Program Verification—Formal methods;
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification—
Model checking; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings of Programs]:
Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs—
Logics of programs; F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and For-
mal Languages]: Mathematical Logic—Temporal logic; C.2.3
[Computer-communication Networks]: Network Operations—
Network Management
Keywords synthesis, verification, model checking, LTL, network
updates, software-defined networking, SDN
1. Introduction
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a new paradigm in which
a logically-centralized controller manages a collection of pro-
grammable switches. The controller responds to events such as
topology changes, shifts in traffic load, or new connections from
hosts, by pushing forwarding rules to the switches, which process
packets efficiently using specialized hardware. Because the con-
troller has global visibility and full control over the entire network,
SDN makes it possible to implement a wide variety of network
applications ranging from basic routing to traffic engineering, data-
center virtualization, fine-grained access control, etc. [6]. SDN has
been used in production enterprise, datacenter, and wide-area net-
works, and new deployments are rapidly emerging.
Much of SDN’s power stems from the controller’s ability to
change the global state of the network. Controllers can set up end-
to-end forwarding paths, provision bandwidth to optimize utiliza-
tion, or distribute access control rules to defend against attacks.
However, implementing these global changes in a running network
is not easy. Networks are complex systems with many distributed
switches, but the controller can only modify the configuration of
one switch at a time. Hence, to implement a global change, an
SDN programmer must explicitly transition the network through
a sequence of intermediate configurations to reach the intended fi-
nal configuration. The code needed to implement this transition is
tedious to write and prone to error—in general, the intermediate
configurations may exhibit new behaviors that would not arise in
the initial and final configurations.
Problems related to network updates are not unique to SDN.
Traditional distributed routing protocols also suffer from anomalies
during periods of reconvergence, including transient forwarding
loops, blackholes, and access control violations. For users, these
anomalies manifest themselves as service outages, degraded per-
formance, and broken connections. The research community has
developed techniques for preserving certain invariants during up-
dates [9, 32, 36], but none of them fully solves the problem, as they
are limited to specific protocols and properties. For example, con-
sensus routing uses distributed snapshots to ensure connectivity, but
only applies to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [16].
It might seem that SDN would exacerbate update-related prob-
lems by making networks even more dynamic—in particular, most
current platforms lack mechanisms for implementing updates in a
graceful way. However, SDN offers opportunities to develop high-
level abstractions for implementing updates automatically while
preserving key invariants. The authors of B4—the controller man-
aging Google’s world-wide inter-datacenter network—describe a
vision where: “multiple, sequenced manual operations [are] not in-
volved [in] virtually any management operation” [14].
Previous work proposed the notion of a consistent update [33],
which ensures that every packet is processed either using the initial
configuration or the final configuration but not a mixture of the two.
Consistency is a powerful guarantee preserving all safety proper-
ties, but it is expensive. The only general consistent update mech-
anism is two-phase update, which tags packets with versions and
maintains rules for the initial/final configurations simultaneously.
This leads to problems on switches with limited memory and can
also make update time slower due to the high degree of rule churn.
We propose an alternative. Instead of forcing SDN operators
to implement updates by hand (as is typically done today), or us-
ing powerful but expensive mechanisms like two-phase update, we
develop an approach for synthesizing correct update programs ef-
ficiently and automatically from formal specifications. Given ini-
tial and final configurations and a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
property capturing desired invariants during the update, we either
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Figure 1: Example topology.
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Figure 2: Example naı¨ve (blue/solid-line), two-phase (green/solid-bar), and or-
dering (red/dashed) updates: (a) probes received; (b) per-switch rule overhead.
generate an SDN program that implements the initial-to-final tran-
sition while ensuring that the property is never violated, or fail if no
such program exists. Importantly, because the synthesized program
is only required to preserve the specified properties, it can leverage
strategies that would be ruled out in other approaches. For example,
if the programmer specifies a trivial property, the system can update
switches in any order. However, if she specifies a more complex
property (e.g. firewall traversal) then the space of possible updates
is more constrained. In practice, our synthesized programs require
less memory and communication than competing approaches.
Programming updates correctly is challenging due to the con-
currency inherent in networks—switches may interleave packet and
control message processing arbitrarily. Hence, programmers must
carefully consider all possible event orderings, inserting synchro-
nization primitives as needed. Our algorithm works by searching
through the space of possible sequences of individual switch up-
dates, learning from counterexamples and employing an incremen-
tal model checker to re-use previously computed results. Our model
checker is incremental in the sense that it exploits the loop-freedom
of correct network configurations to enable efficient re-checking
of properties when the model changes. Because the synthesis al-
gorithm poses a series of closely-related model checking ques-
tions, the incrementality yields enormous performance gains on
real-world update scenarios.
We have implemented the algorithm and heuristics to further
speed up synthesis and eliminate spurious synchronization. We
have interfaced the tool with Frenetic [8], synthesized updates for
OpenFlow switches, and used our system to process actual traffic
generated by end-hosts. We ran experiments on a suite of real-world
topologies, configurations, and properties—our results demonstrate
the effectiveness of synthesis, which scales to over one-thousand
switches, and incremental model checking, which outperforms a
popular symbolic model checker used in batch mode, and a state-
of-the-art network model checker used in incremental mode.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• We investigate using synthesis to automatically generate net-
work updates (§2).
• We develop a simple operational model of SDN and formalize
the network update problem precisely (§3).
• We design a counterexample-guided search algorithm that
solves instances of the network update problem, and prove this
algorithm to be correct (§4).
• We present an incremental LTL model checker for loop-free
models (§5).
• We describe an OCaml implementation with backends to third-
party model checkers and conduct experiments on real-world
networks and properties, demonstrating strong performance im-
provements (§6). †
Overall, our work takes a challenging network programming prob-
lem and automates it, yielding a powerful tool for building dynamic
SDN applications that ensures correct, predictable, and efficient
network behavior during updates.
2. Overview
To illustrate key challenges related to network updates, consider
the network in Figure 1. It represents a simplified datacenter topol-
ogy [1] with core switches (C1 and C2), aggregation switches (A1
to A4), top-of-rack switches (T1 to T4), and hosts (H1 to H4). Ini-
tially, we configure switches to forward traffic from H1 to H3 along
the solid/red path: T1-A1-C1-A3-T3. Later, we wish to shift traffic
from the red path to the dashed/green path, T1-A1-C2-A3-T3 (per-
haps to take C1 down for maintenance). To implement this update,
the operator must modify forwarding rules on switches A1 and C2,
but note that certain update sequences break connectivity—e.g., up-
dating A1 followed by C2 causes packets to be forwarded to C2 be-
fore it is ready to handle them. Figure 2(a) demonstrates this with a
simple experiment performed using our system. Using the Mininet
network simulator and OpenFlow switches, we continuously sent
ICMP (ping) probes during a “naı¨ve” update (blue/solid line) and
the ordering update synthesized by our tool (red/dashed line). With
the naı¨ve update, 100% of the probes are lost during an interval,
while the ordering update maintains connectivity.
Consistency. Previous work [33] introduced the notion of a con-
sistent update and also developed general mechanisms for ensuring
consistency. An update is said to be consistent if every packet is
processed entirely using the initial configuration or entirely using
the final configuration, but never a mixture of the two. For exam-
ple, updating A1 followed by C2 is not consistent because packets
from H1 to H3 might be dropped instead of following the red path
or the green path. One might wonder whether preserving consis-
tency during updates is important, as long as the network eventu-
ally reaches the intended configuration, since most networks only
provide best-effort packet delivery. While it is true that errors can
be masked by protocols such as TCP when packets are lost, there
is growing interest in strong guarantees about network behavior.
For example, consider a business using a firewall to protect internal
servers, and suppose that they decide to migrate their infrastructure
to a virtualized environment like Amazon EC2. To ensure that this
new deployment is secure, the business would want to maintain the
same isolation properties enforced in their home office. However, a
best-effort migration strategy that only eventually reaches the tar-
get configuration could step through arbitrary intermediate states,
some of which may violate this property.
Two-Phase Updates. Previous work introduced a general
consistency-preserving technique called two-phase update [33].
The idea is to explicitly tag packets upon ingress and use these
version tags to determine which forwarding rules to use at each
hop. Unfortunately, this has a significant cost. During the transition,
switches must maintain forwarding rules for both configurations,
effectively doubling the memory requirements needed to complete
the update. This is not always practical in networks where the
switches store forwarding rules using ternary content-addressable
† The PLDI 2015 Artifact Evaluation Committee (AEC) found that our tool
“met or exceeded expectations.”
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memories (TCAM), which are expensive and power-hungry. Fig-
ure 2(b) shows the results of another simple experiment where we
measured the total number of rules on each switch: with two-phase
updates, several switches have twice the number of rules compared
to the synthesized ordering update. Even worse, it takes a non-
trivial amount of time to modify forwarding rules—sometimes on
the order of 10ms per rule [15]! Hence, because two-phase updates
modify a large number of rules, they can increase update latency.
These overheads can make two-phase updates a non-starter.
Ordering Updates. Our approach is based on the observation that
consistent (two-phase) updates are overkill in many settings. Some-
times consistency can be achieved by simply choosing a correct
order of switch updates. We call this type of update an ordering
update. For example, to update from the red path to the green path,
we can update C2 followed by A1. Moreover, even when we can-
not achieve full consistency, we can often still obtain sufficiently
strong guarantees for a specific application by carefully updating
the switches in a particular order. To illustrate, suppose that instead
of shifting traffic to the green path, we wish to use the blue (dashed-
and-dotted) path: T1-A2-C1-A4-T3. It is impossible to transition
from the red path to the blue path by ordering switch updates with-
out breaking consistency: we can update A2 and A4 first, as they
are unreachable in the initial configuration, but if we update T1 fol-
lowed by C1, then packets can traverse the path T1-A2-C1-A3-T3,
while if we update C1 followed by T1, then packets can traverse the
path T1-A1-C1-A4-T3. Neither of these alternatives is allowed in a
consistent update. This failure to find a consistent update hints at a
solution: if we only care about preserving connectivity between H1
and H3, then either path is actually acceptable. Thus, either updat-
ing C1 before T1, or T1 before C1 would work. Hence, if we relax
strict consistency and instead provide programmers with a way to
specify properties that must be preserved across an update, then or-
dering updates will exist in many situations. Recent work [15, 25]
has explored ordering updates, but only for specific properties like
loop-freedom, blackhole-freedom, drop-freedom, etc. Rather than
handling a fixed set of “canned” properties, we use a specification
language that is expressive enough to encode these properties and
others, as well as conjunctions/disjunctions of properties—e.g. en-
forcing loop-freedom and service-chaining during an update.
In-flight Packets and Waits. Sometimes an additional synchro-
nization primitive is needed to generate correct ordering updates
(or correct two-phase updates, for that matter). Suppose we want
to again transition from the red path to blue one, but in addition to
preserving connectivity, we want every packet to traverse either A2
or A3 (this scenario might arise if those switches are actually mid-
dleboxes which scrub malicious packets before forwarding). Now
consider an update that modifies the configurations on A2, A4, T1,
C1, in that order. Between the time that we update T1 and C1, there
might be some packets that are forwarded by T1 before it is up-
dated, and are forwarded by C1 after it is updated. These packets
would not traverse A2 or A3, and so indicate a violation of the spec-
ification. To fix this, we can simply pause after updating T1 until
any packets it previously forwarded have left the network. We thus
need a command “wait” that pauses the controller for a sufficient
period of time to ensure that in-flight packets have exited the net-
work. Hence, the correct update sequence for this example would
be as above, with a “wait” between T1 and C1. Note that two-
phase updates also need to wait, once per update, since we must
ensure that all in-flight packets have left the network before delet-
ing the old version of the rules on switches. Other approaches have
traded off control-plane waiting for stronger consistency, e.g. [24]
performs updates in “rounds” that are analogous to “wait” com-
mands, and Consensus Routing [16] relies on timers to obtain wait-
like functionality. Note that the single-switch update time can be
on the order of seconds [15, 22], whereas typical datacenter transit
time (the time for a packet to traverse the network) is much lower,
even on the order of microseconds [3]. Hence, waiting for in-flight
packets has a negligible overall effect. In addition, our reachability-
based heuristic eliminates most waits in practice.
Summary. This paper presents a sound and complete algorithm
and implementation for synthesizing a large class of ordering up-
dates efficiently and automatically. The updates we generate ini-
tially modify each switch at most once and “wait” between updates
to switches, but a heuristic removes an overwhelming majority of
unnecessary waits in practice. For example, in switching from the
red path to the blue path (while preserving connectivity from H1 to
H3, and making sure that each packet visits either A3 or A4), our
tool produces the following sequence: update A2, then A4, then
T1, then wait, then update C1. The resulting update can be exe-
cuted using the Frenetic SDN platform and used with OpenFlow
switches—e.g., we generated Figure 2 (a-b) using our tool.
3. Preliminaries and Network Model
To facilitate precise reasoning about networks during updates, we
develop a formal model in the style of Chemical Abstract Ma-
chine [4]. This model captures key network features using a simple
operational semantics. It is similar to the one used by [11], but is
streamlined to model features most relevant to updates.
3.1 Network Model
Basic structures. Each switch sw , port pt , or host h is identified
by a natural number. A packet pkt is a record of fields containing
header values such as source and destination address, protocol type,
and so on. We write {f1; . . . ; fk} for the type of packets having
fields fi and use “dot” notation to project fields from records. The
notation {r with f = v} denotes functional update of r.f .
Forwarding Tables. A switch configuration is defined in terms
of forwarding rules, where each rule has a pattern pat specified
as a record of optional packet header fields and a port, a list of
actions act that either forward a packet out a given port (fwd pt)
or modify a header field (f :=n), and a priority that disambiguates
rules with overlapping patterns. We write {pt?; f1?; . . . ; fk?} for
the type of patterns, where the question mark denotes an option
type. A set of such rules ruls forms a forwarding table tbl . The
semantic function [[tbl ]] maps packet-port pairs to multisets of such
pairs, finding the highest-priority rule whose pattern matches the
packet and applying the corresponding actions. If there are multiple
matching rules with the same priority, the function is free to pick
any of them, and if there are no matching rules, it drops the packet.
The forwarding tables collectively define the network’s data plane.
Commands. The control plane modifies the data plane by is-
suing commands that update forwarding tables. The command
(sw , tbl) replaces the forwarding table on switch sw with tbl (we
call this a switch-granularity update). We model this command as
an atomic operation (it can be implemented with OpenFlow bun-
dles [31]). Sometimes switch granularity is too coarse to find an up-
date sequence, in which case one can update individual rules (rule-
granularity). Our tool supports this finer-grained mode of opera-
tion, but since it is not conceptually different from switch granular-
ity, we frame most of our discussion in terms of switch-granularity.
To synchronize updates involving multiple switches, we include
a wait command. In the model, the controller maintains a natural-
number counter known as the current epoch ep. Each packet is
annotated with the epoch on ingress. The control command incr
increments the epoch so that subsequent incoming packets are an-
notated with the next epoch, and flush blocks the controller until all
packets annotated with the previous epoch have exited the network.
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Switch sw ∈ N
Port pt ∈ N
Host h ∈ N
Priority pri ∈ N
Epoch ep ∈ N
Field f ::= src | dst | typ | ..
Packet pkt ::= {f1; ..; fk}
Pair pr ::= (pkt , pt)
Pattern pat ::= {pt?; f1?; ..; fk?}
Action act ::= fwd pt | f :=n
Rule rul ::= {pri ; pat ; acts}
Table tbl ::= ruls
Location loc ::= h | (sw , pt)
Command cmd ::= (sw , tbl) | incr | flush
Switch S ::= {sw ; tbl ; prs}
Link L ::= {loc; pkts; loc′}
Controller C ::= {cmds; ep}
Element E ::= S | L | C
Data Plane
L.loc = h L.loc′ = (sw ′, pt ′) L.pkts = pkts C.ep = ep
C, L −→ C, {L with pkts = pktep ::pkts} IN
L.loc = (sw , pt) L.loc′ = h L.pkts = (pktep ::pkts)
L
(sw,pt,pkt)−−−−−−−→ {L with pkts = pkts}
OUT
L.loc′ = (sw , pt) L.pkts = (pktep ::pkts) S.sw = sw [[S.tbl ]](pkt , pt) = {(pkt1, pt1), .., (pktn, ptn)}
L, S
(sw,pt,pkt)−−−−−−−→ {L with pkts = pkts}, {S with prs = S.prs unionmulti {(pktep1 , pt1), .., (pktepn , ptn)}}
PROCESS
S.sw = sw S.prs = {(pktep , pt)} unionmulti prs L.loc = (sw , pt)
S, L −→ {S with prs = prs}, {L with pkts = L.pkts@[pktep ]} FORWARD
Control Plane and Abstract Machine
C.cmds = ((sw , tbl)::cmds) S.sw = sw
C, S −→ {C with cmds = cmds}, {S with tbl = tbl} UPDATE
C.cmds = (incr ::cmds)
C −→ {C with cmds = cmds; ep = C.ep + 1} INCR
C.cmds = (flush::cmds) ep(S1, .., Sk, L1, .., Lm) = C.ep
S1, .., Sk, L1, .., Lm, C −→ S1, .., Sk, L1, .., Lm, {C with cmds = cmds}
FLUSH
Es1
o−→ Es′1
Es1 unionmulti Es2 o−→ Es′1 unionmulti Es2
CONGRUENCE
Figure 3: Network model.
We introduce a command wait defined as incr ; flush . The epochs
are included in our model solely to enable reasoning. They do not
need to be implemented in a real network—all that is needed is a
mechanism for blocking the controller to allow a flush of all packets
currently in the network. For example, given a topology, one could
compute a conservative delay based on the maximum hop count,
and then implement wait by sleeping, rather than synchronizing
with each switch. Note that we implicitly assume failure-freedom
and packet-forwarding fairness of switches and links, i.e. there is
an upper bound on each element’s packet-processing time.
Elements. The elements E of the network model include
switches Si, links Lj , and a single controller element C, and a
network N is a tuple containing these. Each switch Si is encoded
as a record comprising a unique identifier sw , a table tbl of pri-
oritized forwarding rules, and a multiset prs of pairs (pkt , pt) of
buffered packets and the ports they should be forwarded to respec-
tively. Each link Lj is represented by a record consisting of two
locations loc and loc′ and a list of queued packets pkts , where a
location is either a host or a switch-port pair. Finally, controller C
is represented by a record containing a list of commands cmds and
an epoch ep. We assume that commands are totally-ordered. The
controller can ensure this by using OpenFlow barrier messages.
Operational semantics. Network behavior is defined by small-
step operational rules in Figure 3. These define interactions be-
tween subsets of elements, based on OpenFlow semantics [28].
States of the model are given by multisets of elements. We write
{x} to denote a singleton multiset, and m1 unionmultim2 for the union of
multisets m1 and m2. We write [x] for a singleton list, and l1@l2
for concatenation of l1 and l2. Each transition N
o−→ N ′ is anno-
tated, with o being either an empty annotation, or an observation
(sw , pt , pkt) indicating the location and packet being processed.
The first rules describe date-plane behavior. The IN rule admits
arbitrary packets into the network from a host, stamping them
with the current controller epoch. The OUT rule removes a packet
buffered on a link adjacent to a host. PROCESS processes a single
packet on a switch, finding the highest priority rule with matching
pattern, applying the actions of that rule to generate a multiset of
packets, and adding those packets to the output buffer. FORWARD
moves a packet from a switch to the adjacent link. The final rules
describe control-plane behavior. UPDATE replaces the table on a
single switch. INCR increments the epoch on the controller, and
FLUSH blocks the controller until all packets in the network are
annotated with at least the current epoch (ep(Es) denotes the
smallest annotation on any packet in Es). Finally, CONGRUENCE,
allows any sub-collection of network elements to interact.
3.2 Network Update Problem
In order to define the network update problem, we need to first
define traces of packets flowing through the network.
Packet traces. Given a networkN , our operational rules can gen-
erate sequences of observations. However, the network can process
many packets concurrently, and we want observations generated by
a single packet. We define a successor relation v for observations
(Definition 7, Appendix A). Intuitively o
ep
v o′ if the network can
directly produce the packet in o′ by processing o in the epoch ep.
Definition 1 (Single-Packet Trace). Let N be a network. A se-
quence (o1 · · · ol) is a single-packet trace of N if N o
′
1−→ . . . o
′
k−→
Nk such that (o1 · · · ol) is a subsequence of (o′1 · · · o′k) for which
• every observation is a successor of the preceding observation
in monotonically increasing epochs, and
• if o1 = o′j = (sw , pt , pkt), then ∃o′i ∈ {o′1, · · · , o′j−1} such
that the o′i transition is an IN moving pkt from host to (sw , pt)
and none of o′i, · · · , o′j−1 is a predecessor of o1, and
• the ol transition is an OUT terminating at a host.
Intuitively, single-packet traces are end-to-end paths through the
network. We write T (N) for the set of single-packet traces gener-
ated byN . A trace (o1 · · · ok) is loop-free if oi 6= oj for all distinct
i and j between 1 and k. We consider only loop-free traces, since
a network that forwards packets around a loop is generally con-
sidered to be misconfigured. In the worst case, forwarding loops
can cause a packet storm, wasting bandwidth and degrading perfor-
mance. Our tool automatically detects/rejects such configurations.
LTL formulas. Many important network properties can be under-
stood by reasoning about the traces that packets can take through
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the network. For example, reachability requires that all packets
starting at src eventually reach dst. Temporal logics are an ex-
pressive and well-studied language for specifying such trace-based
properties. Hence, we use Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) to describe
traces in our network model. Let AP be atomic propositions that
test the value of a switch, port, or packet field: fi = n. We call
elements of the set 2AP traffic classes. Intuitively, each traffic class
T identifies a set of packets that agree on the values of particular
header fields. An LTL formula ϕ in negation normal form (NNF)
is either true, false, atomic proposition p in AP , negated propo-
sition ¬p, disjunction ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, conjunction ϕ2 ∧ ϕ2, next Xϕ,
until ϕ1Uϕ2, or release ϕ1Rϕ2, where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are LTL for-
mulas in NNF. The operators F and G can be defined using other
connectives. Since (finite) single-packet traces can be viewed as in-
finite sequences of packet observations where the final observation
repeats indefinitely, the semantics of the LTL formulas can be de-
fined in a standard way over traces. We write t |= ϕ to indicate
that the single-packet trace t satisfies the formula ϕ and T |= ϕ
to indicate that t |= ϕ for each t in T . Given a network N and a
formula ϕ, we write N |= ϕ if T (N) |= ϕ.
Problem Statement. Recall that our network model includes
commands for updating a single switch, incrementing the epoch,
and waiting until all packets in the preceding epoch have been
flushed from the network. At a high-level, our goal is to identify
a sequence of commands to transition the network between config-
urations without violating specified invariants. First, we need a bit
of notation. Given a network N , we write N [sw ← tbl ] for the
switch update obtained by updating the forwarding table for switch
sw to tbl . We call N static if C.cmds is empty. If static networks
N1, Nn have the same traces T (N1) = T (Nn), then we say they
are trace-equivalent, N1 ' Nn.
Definition 2 (Network Update). Let N1 be a static network. A
command sequence cmds induces a sequenceN1, . . . , Nn of static
networks if c1 · · · cn−1 are the update commands in cmds , and for
each ci = (sw , tbl), we have Ni[sw ← tbl ] ' Ni+1.
We write N1
cmds−→ Nn if there exists such a sequence of static
networks induced by cmds which ends with Nn.
We callN stable if all packets inN are annotated with the same
epoch. Intuitively, a stable network is one with no in-progress up-
date, i.e. any preceding update command was finalized with a wait.
Consider the set of unconstrained single-packet traces generated by
removing the requirement that traces start at an ingress (see Defi-
nition 8, Appendix A). This includes T (N) as well as traces of
packets initially present in N . We call this T¯ (N), and note that for
a stable network N , T¯ (N) is equal to T (N).
Definition 3 (Update Correctness). Let N be a stable static net-
work and let ϕ be an LTL formula. The command sequence cmds
is correct with respect to N and ϕ if Nˆ |= φ where Nˆ is obtained
from N by setting C.cmds = cmds .
A network configuration is a static network which contains no
packets. We can now present the problem statement.
Definition 4 (Update Synthesis Problem). Given stable static net-
work N , network configuration N ′, and LTL specification ϕ, con-
struct a sequence of commands cmds such that (i) N cmds−→ N ′′
where N ′′ ' N ′, and (ii) cmds is correct with respect to ϕ.
3.3 Efficiently Checking Network Properties
To facilitate efficient checking of network properties via LTL model
checkers, we show how to model a network as a Kripke structure.
Kripke structures. A Kripke structure is a tuple (Q,Q0, δ, λ),
where Q is a finite set of states, Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states,
δ ⊆ Q × Q is a transition relation, and λ : Q → 2AP labels
each state with a set of atomic propositions drawn from a fixed set
AP . A Kripke structure is complete if every state has at least one
successor. A state q ∈ Q is a sink state if for all states q′, δ(q, q′)
implies that q = q′, and we call a Kripke structure DAG-like if
the only cycles are self-loops on sink states. In this paper, we will
consider complete and DAG-like Kripke structures. A trace t is an
infinite sequence of states, t0t1 . . . such that ∀i ≥ 0 : δ(ti, ti+1).
Given a trace t, we write ti for the suffix of t starting at the i-th
position—i.e., ti = titi+1 . . .. Given a set of traces T , we let T i
denote the set {ti | t ∈ T }. Given a state q of a Kripke structure
K, let tracesK(q) be the set of traces of K starting from q and
succK(q) be the set of states defined by q′ ∈ succK(q) if and only
if δ(q, q′). We will omit the subscript K when it is clear form the
context. A Kripke structure K = (Q,Q0, δ, λ) satisfies an LTL
formula ϕ if for all states q0 ∈ Q0 we have that traces(q0) |= ϕ.
Network Kripke structures. For every static N , we can gener-
ate a Kripke structure K(N) containing traces which correspond
according to an intuitive trace relation . (Definition 9, 10, Ap-
pendix A). We currently do not reason about packet modification,
so the Kripke structure has disjoint parts corresponding to the traf-
fic classes. It is straightforward to enable packet modification, by
adding transitions between the parts of the Kripke structure, but we
leave this for future work. We now show that the generated Kripke
structure faithfully encodes the network semantics.
Lemma 1 (Network Kripke Structure Soundness). Let N be a
static network and K = K(N) a network Kripke structure. For
every single-packet trace t in T (N) there exists a trace t′ of K
from a start state such that t . t′, and vice versa.
This means that checking LTL over single-packet traces can be
performed via LTL model-checking of Kripke structures.
Checking network configurations. One key challenge arises be-
cause the network is a distributed system. Packets can “see” an in-
consistent configuration (some switches updated, some not), and
reasoning about possible interleavings of commands becomes in-
tractable in this context. We can simplify the problem if we ensure
that each packet traverses at most one switch that was updated after
the packet entered the network.
Definition 5 (Careful Command Sequences). A sequence of com-
mands (cmd1 · · · cmdn) is careful if every pair of switch updates
is separated by a wait command.
In the rest of this paper, we consider careful command sequences,
and develop a sound and complete algorithm that finds them ef-
ficiently. Section 4 describes a technique for removing wait com-
mands that works well in practice, but we leave optimal wait re-
moval for future work. Recall that T (N) denotes the sequence of
all traces that a packet could take through the network, regardless of
when the commands in N.cmds are executed. This is a superset of
the traces induced by each staticNi in a solution to the network up-
date problem. However, if cmds is careful, then each packet only
encounters a single configuration, allowing the correctness of the
sequence to be reduced to the correctness of each Ni.
Lemma 2 (Careful Correctness). Let N be a stable network with
C.cmds careful and let ϕ be an LTL formula. If cmds is careful
and Ni |= φ for each static network in any sequence induced by
cmds , then cmds is correct with respect to ϕ.
In Lemmas 5 and 6 (Appendix A), we show that checking the
unique sequence of network configurations induced by cmds is
equivalent to the above. Next we will develop a sound and com-
plete algorithm that solves the update synthesis problem for careful
sequences by checking configurations.
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Procedure ORDERUPDATE(Ni,Nf , ϕ)
Input: Initial static network Ni, final static configuration Nf , formula ϕ.
Output: update sequence L, or error  if no update sequence exists
1: W ← false . Formula encoding wrong configurations.
2: V ← false . Formula encoding visited configurations.
3: (ok, L)← DFSFORORDER(Ni,K(Ni),⊥, ϕ, λ0)
4: if ok then return L
5: else return  . Failure—no update exists.
Procedure DFSFORORDER(N ,K,s,ϕ,λ)
Input: Static network N and Kripke structure K, next switch to update s,
formula ϕ, and labeling λ.
Output: Boolean ok if a correct update exists; correct update sequence L
6: if N |= V ∨W then return (false, [ ])
7: if s = ⊥ then (ok, cex, λ)← modelCheck(K,ϕ)
8: else
9: (N ,K, S)← swUpdate(N , s)
10: (ok, cex, λ)← incrModelCheck(K,ϕ, S, λ)
11: V ← V ∨makeFormula(N )
12: if ¬ok then
13: W ←W ∨makeFormula(cex)
14: return (false, [ ])
15: if N = Nf then return (true, [s])
16: for s′ ∈ possibleUpdates(N ) do
17: (ok, L)← DFSFORORDER(N ,K, s′, ϕ, λ)
18: if ok then return (true, (upd s′) :: wait :: L)
19: return (false, [ ])
Figure 4: ORDERUPDATE Algorithm.
4. Update Synthesis Algorithm
This section presents a synthesis algorithm that searches through
the space of possible solutions, using counterexamples to detect
wrong configurations and exploiting several optimizations.
4.1 Algorithm Description
ORDERUPDATE (Figure 4) returns a simple sequence of updates
(one in which each switch appears at most once), or fails if no such
sequence exists. Note that we could broaden our simple definition,
e.g. k-simple, where each switch appears at most k times, but we
have found the above restriction to work well in practice. The core
procedure is DFSFORORDER, which manages the search and in-
vokes the model checker (we use DFS because we expect common
properties/configurations to admit many update sequences). It at-
tempts to add a switch s to the current update sequence, yielding a
new network configuration. We maintain two formulas, V and W ,
tracking the set of configurations that have been visited so far, and
the set of configurations excluded by counterexamples.
To check whether all packet traces in this configuration satisfy
the LTL property ϕ, we use our (incremental) model checking
algorithm (discussed in Section 5). First, we call a full check of the
model (line 7). The model checker labels the Kripke structure nodes
with information about what formulas hold for paths starting at that
state. The labeling (stored in λ) is then re-used in the subsequent
model checking calls for related Kripke structures (line 10). The
parameters passed in the incremental model checking call are:
updated Kripke structure K, specification ϕ, set of nodes S in
K whose transition function has changed by the update of the
switch s, and correct labeling λ of the Kripke structure before the
update. Note that before the initial model checking, we convert
the network configuration N to a Kripke structure K. The update
of K is performed by a function swUpdate that returns a triple
(N ′, S,K′), where N ′ is the new static network,K′ is the updated
Kripke structure obtained as K(N ′), and S is the set of nodes that
have different outgoing transitions in K′.
If the model checker returns true, then N is safe and the search
proceeds recursively, after adding (upd s′) to the current sequence
of commands. If the model checker returns false, the search back-
tracks, using the counterexample-learning approach below.
4.2 Optimizations
We now present optimizations improving synthesis (pruning with
counterexamples, early search termination), and improving effi-
ciency of synthesized updates (wait removal).
A. Counterexamples. Counterexample-based pruning learns net-
work configurations that do not satisfy the specification to avoid
making future model checking calls that are certain to fail. The
function makeFormula(cex ) (Line 13) returns a formula repre-
senting the set of switches that occurred in the counterexample
trace cex, with flags indicating whether each switch was updated.
This allows equivalent future configurations to be eliminated with-
out invoking the model checker. Recall the red-green example in
Section 2 and suppose that we update A1 and then C2. At the inter-
mediate configuration obtained by updating just A1, packets will be
dropped at C2, and the specification (H1-H3 connectivity) will not
be satisfied. The formula for the unsafe set of configurations that
have A1 updated and C2 not updated will be added to W . In prac-
tice, many counterexamples are small compared to network size,
and this greatly prunes the search space.
B. Early search termination. The early search termination op-
timization speeds up termination of the search when no (switch-
granularity) update sequence is possible. Recall how we use coun-
terexamples to prune configurations. With similar reasoning, we
can use counterexamples for pruning possible sequences of up-
dates. Consider a counterexample trace which involves three nodes
A,B,C, with A updated, B updated, and C not updated. This can
be seen as requiring that C must be updated before A, or C must
be updated before B. Early search termination involves collecting
such constraints on possible updates, and terminating if these con-
straints taken together form a contradiction. In our tool, this is done
efficiently using an (incremental) SAT solver. If the solver deter-
mines that no update sequence is possible, the search terminates.
For simplicity, early search termination is not shown in Figure 4.
C. Wait removal. This heuristic eliminates waits that are un-
necessary for correctness. Consider an update sequence L =
cmd0cmd1 · · · cmdn, and consider some switch update cmdk =
(upd s). In the configuration resulting from executing the sequence
cmd0cmd1 · · · cmdk−1, if the switch s cannot possibly receive
a packet which passed through some switch s0 before an update
cmd j=(upd s0) where j < k, then we can update s without wait-
ing. Thus, we can remove some unnecessary waits if we can main-
tain reachability-between-switches information during the update.
Wait removal is not shown in Figure 4, but in our tool, it operates as
a post-processing pass once an update sequence is found. In prac-
tice, this removes a majority of unnecessary waits (see § 6).
4.3 Formal Properties
The following two theorems show that our algorithm is sound for
careful updates, and complete if we limit our search to simple
update sequences (see Appendix B for proofs).
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Given initial network Ni, final configu-
ration Nf , and LTL formula ϕ, if ORDERUPDATE returns a com-
mand sequence cmds , then Ni
cmds−→ N ′ s.t. N ′ ' Nf , and cmds
is correct with respect to ϕ and Ni.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Given initial network Ni, final con-
figuration Nf , and specification ϕ, if there exists a simple, careful
sequence cmds with Ni
cmds−→ N ′ s.t. N ′ ' Nf , then ORDERUP-
DATE returns one such sequence.
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5. Incremental Model Checking
We now present an incremental algorithm for model checking
Kripke structures. This algorithm is central to our synthesis tool,
which invokes the model checker on many closely related struc-
tures. The algorithm makes use of the fact that the only cycles in the
Kripke structure are self-loops on sink nodes—something that is
true of structures encoding loop-free network configurations—and
re-labels the states of a previously-labeled Kripke structure with the
(possibly different) formulas that hold after an update.
5.1 State Labeling
We begin with an algorithm for labeling states of a Kripke struc-
ture with sets of formulas, following the approach of [39] (WVS)
and [37]. The WVS algorithm translates an LTL formula ϕ into a
local automaton and an eventuality automaton. The local automa-
ton checks consistency between a state and its predecessor, and
handles labeling of all formulas except ϕ1 U ϕ2, which is checked
by the eventuality automaton. The two automata are composed into
a single Bu¨chi automaton whose states correspond to subsets of the
set of subformulas of ϕ and their negations. Hence, we label each
Kripke state by a set L of sets of formulas such that if a state q is
labeled by L, then for each set of formulas S in L, there exists a
trace t starting from q satisfying all the formulas in S.
We now describe state labeling precisely. Let ϕ be an LTL
formula in NNF. The extended closure of ϕ, written ecl(ϕ), is the
set of all subformulas of ϕ and their negations:
• true ∈ ecl(ϕ)
• ϕ ∈ ecl(ϕ)
• If ψ ∈ ecl(ϕ), then ¬ψ ∈ ecl(ϕ)
(we identify ψ with ¬¬ψ, for all ψ).
• If ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ), then ϕ1 ∈ ecl(ϕ) and ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ).
• If ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ), then ϕ1 ∈ ecl(ϕ) and ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ).
• If X ϕ1 ∈ ecl(ϕ), then ϕ1 ∈ ecl(ϕ).
• If ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ), then ϕ1 ∈ ecl(ϕ) and ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ)
• If ϕ1Rϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ), then ϕ1 ∈ ecl(ϕ) and ϕ2 ∈ ecl(ϕ).
A subset M ⊂ ecl(ϕ) of the extended closure is said to be
maximally consistent if it contains true and is simultaneously
closed and consistent under boolean operations:
• true ∈M
• ψ ∈M iff ¬ψ 6∈M (we identify ψ with ¬¬ψ, for all ψ)
• ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈M iff (ϕ1 ∈M or ϕ2 ∈M )
• ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈M iff (ϕ1 ∈M and ϕ2 ∈M )
Likewise, the relation follows(M1,M2) captures the notion of suc-
cessor induced by LTL’s temporal operators, lifted to maximally-
consistent sets. We say follows(M1,M2) holds if and only if all of
the following hold:
• X ϕ1 ∈M1 iff ϕ1 ∈M2
• ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∈M1 iff
(
ϕ2 ∈M1 ∨ (ϕ1 ∈M1 ∧ ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∈M2)
)
• ϕ1Rϕ2 ∈M1 iff
(
ϕ1 ∈M1 ∨ (ϕ2 ∈M1 ∧ ϕ1Rϕ2 ∈M2)
)
Given a trace t and a maximally-consistent setM , we write t |= M
if and only if for all ψ ∈M , we have t |= ψ.
For the rest of this section, we fix a Kripke structure K =
(Q,Q0, δ, λ), a state q in Q, an LTL formula ϕ in NNF, and a
maximally-consistent set M ⊂ ecl(ϕ).
To compute the label of a state q, there are two cases depending
on whether it is a sink state or a non-sink state. If q is a sink state,
the function HoldsSink(q,M) computes a predicate that is true if
and only if, for all ψ ∈ M and the unique trace t starting from q,
we have t |= ψ. More formally, HoldsSink(q,M) is defined to be
(∀ψ ∈ M : Holds0 (q, ψ)), where Holds0 is defined as in Figure
5. The function Holds0 computes a predicate that is true if and
only if ψ holds at q. For example, Holds0 (q, φ1 U φ2) is defined
as Holds0 (q, φ2) because the only transition from q is a self-loop.
Holds0 (q, p) = q |= p
Holds0 (q,¬p) = q 6|= p
Holds0 (q, φ1 ∧ φ2) = Holds0 (q, φ1) ∧Holds0 (q, φ2)
Holds0 (q, φ1 ∨ φ2) = Holds0 (q, φ1) ∨Holds0 (q, φ2)
Holds0 (q,Xφ) = Holds0 (q, φ)
Holds0 (q, φ1 U φ2) = Holds0 (q, φ2)
Holds0 (q, φ1 R φ2) = Holds0 (q, φ1) ∨Holds0 (q, φ2)
Figure 5: The Holds0 function
For the second case, suppose q is a non-sink state. If we are
given a labeling for succK(q) (the successors of the node q), we
can extend it to a labeling for q. Let V ⊆ Q be a set of vertices. A
function labGrK is a correct labeling of K with respect to ϕ and
V if for every v ∈ V , it returns a set L of maximally consistent
sets such that (a) M ∈ L if and only if M ⊂ ecl(ϕ), and (b)
there exists a trace t in traces(v) such that t |= M . Suppose that
labGrK is a correct labeling ofK with respect to ϕ and succK(q).
The function HoldsK(q,M, labGrK) computes a predicate that is
true if and only if there exists a trace t in tracesK(q) with t |= M .
Formally, HoldsK(q,M, labGrK) is defined as (λ(q) = (AP ∩
M)) ∧ ∃q′ ∈ succK(q),M ′ ∈ labGrK(q′) : follows(M,M ′).
The following captures the correctness of labeling:
Lemma 3. First, HoldsSink(q,M) ⇔ ∃t ∈ traces(q) : t |= M
for sink states q. Second, if labGrK is a correct labeling with
respect to ϕ and succK(q), then HoldsK(q,M, labGrK) ⇐⇒
∃t ∈ tracesK(q) : t |= M .
Finally, we define labelNodeK(ϕ, q, labGrK), which com-
putes a label L for q such that M ∈ L if and only if there exists
a trace t ∈ tracesK(q) such that t |= M for all M ⊂ ecl(ϕ).
We assume that labGrK is a correct labeling of K with respect to
ϕ and succ(q). For sink states, labelNodeK(ϕ, q, labGrK) returns
{M |M ∈ ecl(ϕ)∧HoldsSink(q,M)}, while for non-sink states
it returns {M |M ∈ ecl(ϕ) ∧HoldsK(q,M, labGrK)}.
5.2 Incremental algorithm
To incrementally model check a modified Kripke structure, we
must re-label its states with the formulas that hold after the update.
Consider two Kripke structures K = (Q,Q0, δ, λ) and K′ =
(Q′, Q′0, δ
′, λ′), such that Q0 = Q′0. Furthermore, assume that
Q = Q′, and there is a set U ⊆ Q such that δ and δ′ differ only on
nodes in U . We call such a triple (K,K′, U) an update of K.
An update (K,K′, U) might add or remove edges connected
to a (small) set of nodes, corresponding to a change in the rules
on a switch. Suppose that labGrK is a correct labeling of K with
respect toϕ andQ. The incremental model checking problem is de-
fined as follows: we are given an update (K,K′, U), and labGrK ,
and we want to know whetherK′ satisfies ϕ. The naı¨ve approach is
to model checkK′ without using the labeling labGrK . We call this
the monolithic approach. In contrast, the incremental approach uses
labGrK (and thus intuitively re-uses the results of model checking
K to efficiently verify K′).
Example. Consider the left side of Figure 6, with H the only
initial state. Suppose that the update modifies J , and the δ′ relation
applied to J only contains the pair (J,N), and consider labeling
the structure with formulas F a, F b, and F a ∨ F b. To simplify
the example, we label a node by all those formulas which hold for
at least one path starting from the node (note that in the algorithm,
a node is labeled by a set of sets of formulas, rather than a set of
formulas). We will have that all the nodes are labeled by F a∨F b,
and in addition the nodes K, I,H,M, J contain label F a, and the
nodesL, I,H,N contain F b. Now we want to relabel the structure
after the update (right-hand side). Given that the update changes
only node J , the labeling can only change for J and its ancestors.
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H
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Figure 6: Incremental labeling—Initial (left), Final (right)
We therefore start labeling node J , and find that it will now be
labeled with F b instead of F a. Labeling proceeds to H , whose
label does not change (still labeled by all of F a, F b, F a ∨ F b).
The labeling process could then stop, even if H has ancestors.
Re-labeling states. Let ancestorsK(V ) be the ancestors of V
in K—i.e., a set of vertices s.t. ancestorsK(V ) ⊆ Q and q ∈
ancestorsK(V ), if some node v ∈ V is reachable from q. To de-
fine incremental model checking for ϕ, we need a function accept-
ing a property ϕ, set of vertices V , labeling labGrK that is correct
for K with respect to ϕ and Q \ ancestorsK(V ), and returns a
correct labeling of K with respect to ϕ and Q. This function is:
relblK(ϕ, labGrK , V ) =
{
labGrK if V = ∅
relblK(ϕ, labGr
′
K , V
′) otherwise
where labGr ′K(v) is labelNodeK(ϕ, v, labGrK) if v ∈ V , and
it is labGrK(v) if v 6∈ V . The set V ′ is {q | ∃v ∈ V : v ∈
succK(q)}.
Theorem 3. Let V ⊆ Q be a set of vertices and labGrK a
correct labeling with respect to ϕ and Q \ ancestorsK(V ). Then
relblK(ϕ, labGrK , V ) is a correct labeling w.r.t. ϕ and Q.
Given a labeling that is correct with respect to ϕ and Q, it
is easy to check whether ϕ is true for all the traces starting in
the initial states: the predicate checkInitStatesK(labGrK , ϕ) is
defined as ∀q0 ∈ Q0,M ∈ labGrK(q0) : ϕ ∈ M . Next,
let Qf be the set of all sink states of K. Then ancestorsK(Qf )
is the set Q of all states K. Therefore, for any initial labeling
labGr0K , relbl(ϕ, labGr
0
K , Qf ) is a correct labeling with respect
to ϕ and Q. The function modelCheckK(ϕ) is defined to be equal
to checkInitStatesK(relblK(ϕ, labGr0K , Qf ), ϕ), where we can
set labGr0K to be the empty labeling λv.∅.
We now define our incremental model checking function. Let
(K,K′, U) be an update, and labGrK a previously-computed cor-
rect labeling of K with respect to ϕ and Q, where Q is the set
of states of K. The function incrModelCheck(K,ϕ,U, labGrK)
is defined as checkInitStatesK′(relblK′(ϕ, labGrK , U), ϕ). The
following shows the correctness of our model checking functions
(proof of this and the previous theorem are in Appendix C).
Corollary 1. First, modelCheckK(ϕ) = true ⇐⇒ K |=
ϕ. Second, for (K,K′, U) and labGrK as above, we have
incrModelCheck(K,ϕ,U, labGrK) = true ⇐⇒ K |= ϕ.
The runtime complexity of the modelCheckK function is
O(|K| × 2|ϕ|). The runtime complexity of the incrModelCheck
function isO(|ancestorsK(U)|×2|ϕ|), whereU is the set of nodes
being updated.
Counterexamples. This incremental algorithm can generate
counterexamples in cases where the formula does not hold. A for-
mula ¬ϕ does not hold if an initial state is labeled by L, such that
there exists a set M ∈ L, such that ¬ϕ ∈ M . Examining the def-
inition of labelNodeK , we find that in order to add a set M to the
label L of a node q, there is a setM ′ in the label of one a child q′ of
q that explains whyM is inL. The first node of the counterexample
trace starting from q is one such child q′.
6. Implementation and Experiments
We have built a prototype tool that implements the algorithms de-
scribed in this paper. It consists of 7K lines of OCaml code. The
system works by building a Kripke structure (§3) and then repeat-
edly interacting with a model checker to synthesize an update. We
currently provide four checker backends: Incremental uses incre-
mental relabeling to check and recheck formulas, Batch re-labels
the entire graph on each call, NuSMV queries a state-of-the-art
symbolic model checker in batch mode, and NetPlumber queries
an incremental network model checker [19]. All tools except Net-
Plumber provide counterexample traces, so our system learns from
counterexamples whenever possible (§4).
Experiments. To evaluate performance, we generated configura-
tions for a variety of real-world topologies and ran experiments
in which we measured the amount of time needed to synthesize
an update (or discover that no order update exists). These experi-
ments were designed to answer two key questions: (1) how the per-
formance of our Incremental checker compares to state-of-the-art
tools (NuSMV and NetPlumber), and (2) whether our synthesizer
scales to large topologies. We used the Topology Zoo [21] dataset,
which consists of 261 actual wide-area topologies, as well as syn-
thetically constructed Small-World [29] and FatTree [1] topologies.
We ran the experiments on a 64-bit Ubuntu machine with 20GB
RAM and a quad-core Intel i5-4570 CPU (3.2 GHz) and imposed
a 10-minute timeout for each run. We ignored runs in which the
solver died due to an out-of-memory error or timeout—these are
infrequent (less than 8% of the 996 runs for Figure 7), and our In-
cremental solver only died in instances where other solvers did too.
Configurations and properties. A recent paper [23] surveyed
data-center operators to discover common update scenarios, which
mostly involve taking switches on/off-line and migrating traffic be-
tween switches/hosts. We designed experiments around a similar
scenario. To create configurations, we connected random pairs of
nodes (s, d) via disjoint initial/final paths Wi,Wf , forming a “dia-
mond”, and asserted one of the following properties for each pair:
• Reachability: traffic from a given source must reach a certain
destination: (port = s)⇒ F (port = d)
• Waypointing: traffic must traverse a waypoint w:
(port=s)⇒ ((port 6=d) U ((port=w) ∧ F (port=d)))
• Service chaining: traffic must waypoint through several inter-
mediate nodes: (port = s)⇒ way(W,d), where
way([ ], d) ≡ F (port = d)
way(wi :: W,d) ≡
(
(
∧
wk∈W port6=wk ∧ port6=d)
U ((port = wi) ∧ way(W,d))
)
.
Incremental vs. NuSMV/Batch. Figure 7 (a-c) compares the per-
formance of Incremental and NuSMV backends for the reachability
property. Of the 247 Topology Zoo inputs that completed success-
fully, our tool solved all of them faster. The measured speedups
were large, with a geometric mean of 447.23x. For the 24 FatTree
examples, the mean speedup was 465.03x, and for the 25 Small-
World examples, the mean speedup was 4484.73x. We also com-
pared the Incremental and Batch solvers on the same inputs. Incre-
mental performs better on almost all examples, with mean speedup
of 4.26x, 5.27x, 11.74x on the datasets shown in Figure 7(a-c) and
maximum runtimes of 0.36s, 2.80s, and 0.92s respectively. The
maximum runtimes for Batch were 6.71s, 39.75s, and 12.50s.
Incremental vs. NetPlumber. We also measured the performance
of Incremental versus the network property checker NetPlumber
(Figure 7(d-f)). Note that NetPlumber uses rule-granularity for
updates, so we enabled this mode in our tool for these experiments.
For the three datasets, our checker is faster on all experiments, with
mean speedups of (6.41x, 4.90x, 17.19x). NetPlumber does not
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Figure 7: Relative performance results: (a-c) Performance of Incremental vs. NuSMV, Batch, NetPlumber solvers on Topology Zoo, FatTree, Small-World
topologies (columns); (d-f) Performance of Incremental vs. NetPlumber (rule-granularity).
0 200 400 600 800 1k (switches)
0
50
100
150
200
(g)
R
un
tim
e
(s
)
Service Chaining
Waypointing
Reachability
0 200 400 600 800 1k (switches)
0
50
100
150
200
(h)
R
un
tim
e
(s
)
0 10k 20k 30k 40k 50k (rules)
0
500
1k
(i)
R
un
tim
e
(s
)
Figure 8: (g) Scalability of Incremental on Small-World topologies of in-
creasing size; (h) Scalability when no correct switch-granularity update ex-
ists (i.e. algorithm reports “impossible”), and (i) Scalability of fine-grained
(rule-granularity) approach for solving switch-impossible examples in (h).
report counterexamples, putting it at a disadvantage in this end-
to-end comparison, so we also measured total Incremental versus
NetPlumber runtime on the same set of model-checking questions
posed by Incremental for the Small-World example. Our tool is still
faster on all instances, with a mean speedup of 2.74x.
Scalability. To quantify our tool’s scalability, we constructed
Small World topologies with up to 1500 switches, and ran experi-
ments with large diamond updates—the largest has 1015 switches
updating. The results appear in Figure 8(g). The maximum synthe-
sis times for the three properties were 129.04s, 30.11s, and 0.85s,
which shows that our tool scales to problems of realistic size.
Infeasible Updates. We also considered examples for which
there is no switch-granular update. Figure 8(h) shows the results
of experiments where we generated a second diamond atop the first
one, requiring it to route traffic in the opposite direction. Using
switch-granularity, the inputs are reported as unsolvable in maxi-
mum time 153.48s, 33.48s, and 0.69s. Using rule-granularity, these
inputs are solved successfully for up to 1000 switches with maxi-
mum times of 776.13s, 512.84s, and 82.00s (see Figure 8(i)).
Waits. We also separately measured the time needed to run the
wait-removal heuristic for the Figure 8 experiments. For (g), the
maximum wait-removal runtime was 0.89s, resulting in 2 needed
waits for each instance. For (i), the maximum wait-removal runtime
was 103.87s, resulting in about 2.6 waits on average (with a maxi-
mum of 4). For the largest problems in (g) and (i), this corresponds
to removal of 1397/1399 and 55823/55826 waits (about 99.9%).
7. Related Work
This paper extends preliminary work reported in a workshop pa-
per [30]. We present a more precise and realistic network model,
and replace expensive calls to an external model checker with calls
to a new built-in incremental network model checker. We extend
the DFS search procedure with optimizations and heuristics that
improve performance dramatically. Finally, we evaluate our tool on
a comprehensive set of benchmarks with real-world topologies.
Synthesis of concurrent programs. There is much previous work
on synthesis for concurrent programs [12, 35, 38]. In particular,
work by Solar-Lezama et al. [35] and Vechev et al. [38] synthesizes
sequences of instructions. However, traditional synthesis and syn-
thesis for networking are quite different. First, traditional synthesis
is a game against the environment which (in the concurrent pro-
gramming case) provides inputs and schedules threads; in contrast,
our synthesis problem involves reachability on the space of config-
urations. Second, our space of configurations is very rich, meaning
that checking configurations is itself a model checking problem.
Network updates. There are many protocol- and property-
specific algorithms for implementing network updates, e.g. avoid-
ing packet/bandwidth loss during planned maintenance to BGP [10,
32]. Other work avoids routing loops and blackholes during IGP
migration [36]. Work on network updates in SDN proposed the
notion of consistent updates and several implementation mech-
anisms, including two-phase updates [33]. Other work explores
propagating updates incrementally, reducing the space overhead on
switches [17]. As mentioned in Section 2, recent work proposes or-
dering updates for specific properties [15], whereas we can handle
combinations and variants of these properties. Furthermore, SWAN
and zUpdate add support for bandwidth guarantees [13, 23]. Zhou
et al. [40] consider customizable trace properties, and propose a dy-
namic algorithm to find order updates. This solution can take into
account unpredictable delays caused by switch updates. However,
it may not always find a solution, even if one exists. In contrast, we
obtain a completeness guarantee for our static algorithm. Ludwig
et al. [24] consider ordering updates for waypointing properties.
Model checking. Model checking has been used for network ver-
ification [2, 18, 20, 26, 27]. The closest to our work is the incre-
mental checker NetPlumber [19]. Surface-level differences include
the specification languages (LTL vs. regular expressions), and Net-
Plumber’s lack of counterexample output. The main difference is
incrementality: Netplumber restricts checking to “probe nodes,”
keeping track of “header-space” reachability information for those
nodes, and then performing property queries based on this. In con-
trast, we look at the property, keeping track of portions of the
property holding at each node, which keeps incremental recheck-
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ing times low. The empirical comparison (Section 6) showed better
performance of our tool as a back-end for synthesis.
Incremental model checking has been studied previously, with
[34] presenting the first incremental model checking algorithm, for
alternation-free µ-calculus. We consider LTL properties and spe-
cialize our algorithm to exploit the no-forwarding-loops assump-
tion. The paper [7] introduced an incremental algorithm, but it is
specific to the type of partial results produced by IC3 [5].
8. Conclusion
We present a practical tool for automatically synthesizing cor-
rect network update sequences from formal specifications. We dis-
cuss an efficient incremental model checker that performs orders
of magnitude better than state-of-the-art monolithic tools. Exper-
iments on real-world topologies demonstrate the effectiveness of
our approach for synthesis. In future work, we plan to explore both
extensions to deal with network failures and bandwidth constraints,
and deeper foundations of techniques for network updates.
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A. Network Model Auxiliary Definitions
We first define what it means for a table to be active, i.e. the
controller contains an update that will eventually produce that table.
Definition 6 (Active Forwarding Table). Let N be a network. The
forwarding table tbl is active in the epoch ep for the switch sw if
1. ep = 0 and tbl is the initial table of sw in N , or
2. ep > 0 and either (a) if there exists a command (sw ′, tbl ′) ∈
C.cmds such that sw = sw ′ and the number of wait com-
mands preceding (sw , tbl) in C.cmds is ep, then tbl = tbl ′, or
(b) if there does not exist such a command, then tbl is the table
active for the switch sw in epoch ep − 1.
Next we define what it means for an observation o′ to succeed o.
Definition 7 (Successor Observation). Let N be a network and let
o = (sw , pt , pkt) and o′ = (sw ′, pt ′, pkt ′) be observations. The
observation o′ is a successor of o in ep, written o
ep
v o′, if either:
• there exists a switch Si and link Lj such that Si.sw = sw and
Si.tbl is active in ep and Lj .loc = (sw , ptj) and Lj .loc
′ =
(sw ′, pt ′) and (ptj , pkt
′) ∈ [[Si.tbl ]](pt , pkt), or
• there exists a switch Si, a link Lj , and a host h such that
Si.sw = sw and Si.tbl is active in ep and Lj .loc = (sw , pt ′)
and Lj .loc′ = h and (pt ′, pkt ′) ∈ [[Si.tbl ]](pt , pkt).
Intuitively o
ep
v o′ if the packet in o could have directly produced
the packet in o′ in ep by being processed on some switch. The two
cases correspond to an internal and egress processing steps.
Definition 8 (Unconstrained Single-Packet Trace). Let N be a
network. The sequence (o1 · · · ol) is a unconstrained single-packet
trace of N if N
o′1−→ . . . o
′
k−→ Nk such that (o1 · · · ol) is a
subsequence of (o′1 · · · o′k) for which
• every observation is a successor of the preceding observation
in monotonically increasing epochs, and
• if o1 = o′j = (sw , pt , pkt), i.e. N
o′1−→ . . . o
′
j=o1−−−−→ Nj
o′j+1−−−→
. . .
o′k−→ Nk, then no o′i ∈ {o′1, · · · , o′j−1} precedes o1, and
• the ol transition is an OUT terminating at a host.
Unconstrained single-packet traces are not required to begin at a
host. We write T¯ (N) for the set of unconstrained single-packet
traces generated by N , and note that T (N) ⊆ T¯ (N).
Definition 9 (Network Kripke Structure). Let N be a static net-
work. We define a Kripke structure K(N) = (Q,Q0, δ, λ) as fol-
lows. The set of statesQ comprises tuples of the form (sw , pt , Tk).
The set Q0 contains states (sw , pt , Tk) where sw and pt are adja-
cent to an ingress link—i.e., there exists a link Lj and host h such
thatLj .loc = h andLj .loc′ = (sw , pt). Transition relation δ con-
tains all pairs of states (sw , pt , Tk) and (sw ′, pt ′, T ′k) where there
exists a switch S and a link L such that S.sw = sw and either:
• there exists a link Lj and packets pkt ∈ Tk and pkt ′ ∈ T ′k
such that L.loc′ = (sw , pt) and Lj .loc = (sw , ptj) and
Lj .loc
′ = (sw ′, pt ′) and (pkt ′, ptj) ∈ [[S.tbl ]](pkt , pt).
• there exists a link Lj , a host h , and packets pkt ∈ Tk and
pkt ′ ∈ T ′k such that L.loc′ = (sw , pt) and Lj .loc = (sw , pt ′)
and Lj .loc′ = h and (pkt ′, pt ′) ∈ [[S.tbl ]](pkt , pt).
• (sw , pt , Tk) = (sw ′, pt ′, T ′k) and there exists a packet pkt ∈
Tk such that L.loc′ = (sw , pt) and [[S.tbl ]](pkt , pt) = {}.
• (sw , pt , Tk) = (sw ′, pt ′, T ′k) and there exists a link Lj and
host h such that Lj .loc = (sw , pt) and Lj .loc′ = h .
Finally, the labeling function λ maps each state (sw , pt , Tk) to
Tk, which captures the set of all possible header values of packets
located at switch sw and port pt .
The four cases of the δ relation correspond to forwarding packets to
an internal link, forwarding packets out an egress, dropping packets
on a switch, or reaching an egress (inducing a self-loop).
We can relate the observations generated by a network N and
the traces of the Kripke structure generated from it.
Definition 10 (Trace Relation). Let N be a static network and
K a Kripke structure. Let . be a relation on observations of N
and states of K defined by (sw , pt , pkt) . (sw , pt , Tk) if and
only if pkt ∈ Tk. Lift . to a relation on (finite) sequences of
observations and (infinite) traces by repeating the final observation
and requiring . to hold pointwise: o1 · · · ok . t if and only if
oi . ti for i from 1 to k and ok . tj for all j > k.
Lemma 4 (Traces of a Stable Network). LetN be a stable network.
Then for each trace t ∈ T¯ (N), there exists a trace t′ ∈ T (N) such
that t is a suffix of t′.
Lemma 5 (Trace-Equivalence). Let N1, Nn be static networks
where N1 → · · · → Nn and no transition is an update command.
For a single-packet trace t, we have t ∈ T (N1) ⇐⇒ t ∈ T (Nn).
Lemma 6 (Induced Sequence of Networks). Let N1 be a static
network, and let N ′1 be the network obtained by emptying all
packets from N1. Let cmds be a sequence of commands, and let
c1 · · · cn−1 be the subsequence of update commands. Construct the
sequence N ′1 → · · · → N ′n of empty networks by executing the
update commands in order. Now, given any sequence N1 → · · · →
Nn induced by cmds , we have Ni ' N ′i for all i.
In other words, any induced sequence of static networks is point-
wise trace-equivalent to the unique sequence of network configura-
tions generated by running the update commands in order.
B. Synthesis Algorithm Correctness Proofs
Lemma 1 (Network Kripke Structure Soundness). Let N be a
static network and K = K(N) a network Kripke structure. For
every single-packet trace t in T (N) there exists a trace t′ of K
from a start state such that t . t′, and vice versa.
Proof. We proceed by induction over k, the length of the (finite
prefix of the) trace. The base case k = 1 is easy to see, since
the lone observation in t must be on an ingress link, meaning the
corresponding state in K will be an initial state with a self-loop
(case 3 of Definition 9), and these are equivalent via Definition 10.
For the inductive step (k > 1), we wish to show both directions
of subtrace relation . to conclude equivalence. First, let t =
o1, · · · , ok+1 be a single-packet trace of length k + 1 in T (N),
and we must show that ∃t′ ∈ K(N) such that t . t′. Let tk
be the prefix of t having length k. By our induction hypothesis,
there exists t′k = s1, · · · , sk−1, sk, sk, · · · ∈ K(N) such that
tk . t′k. We have the successor relation ok v ok+1, so Definition
7 and 9 tells us that we have a transition sk → s′ for some
s′ ∈ K. We see that this s′ is exactly what we need to construct
t′ = s1, · · · , sk, s′, s′, · · · which satisfies the relation t . t′.
Now, let t′ = s1, · · · , sk, sk+1, sk+1, · · · be a trace in K(N)
for which the finite prefix has length k + 1. We must show that
∃t ∈ T (N) such that t . t′. Let t′k = s1, · · · , sk−1, sk, sk, · · · ,
and by our induction hypothesis, and there exists tk = o1, · · · , ok
such that tk . t′k. Consider transition sk → sk+1. If sk = sk+1,
then t′ = t′k, so we can let t = tk, and conclude that t . t′.
Otherwise, if sk 6= sk+1, then we have one of the first two cases
in Definition 9, which correspond to the cases in Definition 7,
allowing us to construct an ok+1 such that ok v ok+1. We let
t = o1, · · · , ok, ok+1, and conclude that t . t′.
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We want to develop a lemma showing that the correctness of careful
command sequences can be reduced to the correctness of each
induced Ni, so we start with the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 7 (Traces of a Careful Network). Let N be a stable
network with C.cmds careful, and consider a sequence of static
networks induced by C.cmds . For every trace t ∈ T (N) there
exists a stable static network Ni in the sequence s.t. t ∈ T (Ni).
Proof. I. First, we show that at most one update transition can be
involved in the trace. In other words, if N
o′1−→ . . . o
′
k−→ Nk where
t = o1 · · · on is a subsequence of o′1 · · · o′k, and if f : N → N is a
bijection between oi indices and o′i indices, then at most one of the
transitions o′f(1), · · · , o′f(n) is an UPDATE transition.
Assume to the contrary that there are more than one such
transitions, and consider two of them, o′i, o
′
j where i, j ∈
{f(1), · · · , f(n)}, assuming without loss of generality that i < j.
Now, since the sequence C.cmds is careful, we must have both an
INCR and FLUSH transition between o′i and o
′
j . This means that the
second update o′j cannot happen while the trace’s packet is still in
the network, i.e. j > f(n), and we have reached a contradiction.
II. Now, if there are zero update transitions, we are done, since
the trace is contained in the first static N . If there is one update
transition Nk+1 = Nk[sw ← tbl ], and this update occurs before
the packet reaches sw in the trace, then the trace is fully contained
in Nk+1. Otherwise, the trace is fully contained in Nk.
Lemma 2 (Careful Correctness). Let N be a stable network with
C.cmds careful and let ϕ be an LTL formula. If cmds is careful
and Ni |= φ for each static network in any sequence induced by
cmds , then cmds is correct with respect to ϕ.
Proof. Consider a trace t ∈ T (N). From Lemma 7, we have
t ∈ T (Ni) for some Ni in the induced sequence. Thus t |= ϕ,
since our hypothesis tells us that Ni |= ϕ. Since this is true for
an arbitrary trace, we have shown that T (N) |= ϕ, i.e. N |= ϕ,
meaning that cmds is correct with respect to ϕ.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Given initial network Ni, final configu-
ration Nf , and LTL formula ϕ, if ORDERUPDATE returns a com-
mand sequence cmds , then Ni
cmds−→ N ′ s.t. N ′ ' Nf , and cmds
is correct with respect to ϕ and Ni.
Proof. It is easy to show that if ORDERUPDATE returns cmds , then
Ni
cmds−→ N ′ where N ′ ' Nf . Each update in the returned sequence
changes a switch configuration of one switch s to the configuration
Nf (s), and the algorithm terminates when all (and only) switches
s such that Ni(s) 6= Nf (s) have been updated.
Observe that if ORDERUPDATE returns cmds , the sequence can
be made careful by choosing an adequate time delay between each
update command, and for all j ∈ {0, · · · , n}, Nj |= ϕ. This is
ensured by the call to a model checker (Line 7). We use Lemma 2
to conclude that cmds is correct with respect to ϕ and Ni.
To show that ORDERUPDATE is complete with respect to simple
and careful command sequences, we observe that ORDERUPDATE
searches through all simple and careful sequences.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Given initial network Ni, final con-
figuration Nf , and specification ϕ, if there exists a simple, careful
sequence cmds with Ni
cmds−→ N ′ s.t. N ′ ' Nf , then ORDERUP-
DATE returns one such sequence.
C. Incremental Checking Correctness Proofs
Lemma 3. First, HoldsSink(q,M) ⇔ ∃t ∈ traces(q) : t |= M
for sink states q. Second, if labGrK is a correct labeling with
respect to ϕ and succK(q), then HoldsK(q,M, labGrK) ⇐⇒
∃t ∈ tracesK(q) : t |= M .
Proof. First, for sink states, observe that there is a unique trace t
in traces(q), as q is a sink state. We first prove that t |= ϕ iff
Holds0 (q, ϕ). We prove this by induction on the structure of the
LTL formula. Then we observe that there is a unique maximally-
consistent setM such that t |= M . This is the set {ψ | t |= ψ∧ψ ∈
ecl(ϕ)}. We then use the definition of HoldsSink(q,M) for sink
states to conclude the proof.
Now consider non-sink states: we first prove soundness, i.e., if
HoldsK(q,M, labGrK), then there exists t ∈ traces(q) such that
t |= M . We have HoldsK(q,M, labGrK) iff (λ(q) = (AP∩M))
and there exists q′ ∈ succK(M), and M ′ ∈ labGrK(q′) such that
follows(M,M ′). By assumption of the theorem, we have that if
M ′ ∈ labGrK(q′), then there exists a trace t′ in traces(q′) such
that t′ |= M ′. Consider a trace t such that t0 = q and t1 = t′.
For each ψ ∈ M , we can prove that t |= ψ as follows. The base
case of the proof by induction is implied by the fact that q |=
(AP ∩M). The inductive cases are proven using the definitions of
maximally-consistent set and the function follows . We now prove
completeness, i.e., that if there exists a trace t in tracesK(q) such
that t |= M , then HoldsK(q,M, labGrK) is true. Let t be the
trace qq1q2 . . .. It is easy to see that ifM is a maximally-consistent
set, and t |= M , then M = {ψ | ψ ∈ ecl(ϕ) ∧ t |= ψ}. Let us
consider the set of formulas S = {ψ | ψ ∈ ecl(ϕ) ∧ t1 |= ψ}.
Observe that S is a maximally-consistent set. By assumption of the
theorem, we have that S is in labGrK(q1). It is easy to verify that
follows(M,S).
Theorem 3. Let V ⊆ Q be a set of vertices and labGrK a
correct labeling with respect to ϕ and Q \ ancestorsK(V ). Then
relblK(ϕ, labGrK , V ) is a correct labeling w.r.t. ϕ and Q.
Proof. We first note that only ancestors of nodes in V are re-
labeled—all the other nodes are correctly labeled by assumption
on labGr . We say that a node q is at level k w.r.t. a set of vertices
T iff the longest simple path from q to a node in T is k. Let Hk
be the set of nodes at level k from V . We prove by induction on k
that at k-th iteration, we have a correct labeling of K w.r.t. ϕ and
(S \ ancestorsK(V ))∪Hk, where S is the set of states of K. We
can prove the inductive claim using Lemma 3.
Corollary 1. First, modelCheckK(ϕ) = true ⇐⇒ K |=
ϕ. Second, for (K,K′, U) and labGrK as above, we have
incrModelCheck(K,ϕ,U, labGrK) = true ⇐⇒ K |= ϕ.
Proof. Using Theorem 3, and the fact that the set ancestorsK(Sf )
is the set S of all states K, we obtain that labGrK =
relblK(ϕ, labGr
0
K , Sf ) is a correct labeling of K with respect
to ϕ and S. In particular, for all initial states q0, we have that
for all M ⊂ ecl(ϕ), m ∈ labGrK(q0) iff there exists a trace
t ∈ tracesK(q0) such that t |= M . We now use the definition of
checkInitStates to show that if checkInitStates returns true, then
there is no initial state q0 such that there exists M ∈ labGrK(q0)
such that ¬ϕ ∈ M . Thus for all initial states q0, for all traces t in
traces(t0), we have that t |= ϕ.
The proof for incremental model checking is similar.
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